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Abstract 
Using a unique administrative level dataset from a large and diverse U.S. financial institution, we 
test the impact of rewards on credit card spending and debt.  Specifically, we study the impact of 
1 percent cash-back reward on individuals before and during their enrollment in the program. We 
find that the marginal increase in spending per month during the first quarter of the program is 
$68.  Average monthly payments decreased more than the marginal increase from cash-back 
rewards resulting in card debt increasing an average of $115 during the first quarter.  Evidence 
from the credit bureaus confirms that consumers offset their increased spending and debt on their 
rewards card by lowering their spending and debt on their other credit cards.  Segmenting the 
data by different types of cardholders, we find that cardholders who do not use their card prior to 
the cash-back program increase their spending and debt more than cardholders with debt prior to 
the cash-back program.  We also find heterogeneous responses by demographic and credit 
constraint characteristics. 
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1.  Introduction 
  Today, rewards are routinely given by airlines, hotel operators, and credit card issuers to 
increase use of their products.  In the case of credit cards, rewards are an effective way to attract 
cardholders or convince existing ones to use a specific card for their purchases and borrowing 
needs.  In 2005, six billion reward card offers were mailed by the credit card industry.  Typically 
these mailing are randomized and the response rates are very low.  For instance, in 2005, the 
response rate was 0.3% (also see Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, and Liu, 2010).  Card companies 
have pursued aggressive tactics, such as offering cash back, airlines miles, rebates and lower 
interest rates.  The main objective of the card companies is to increase card spending that may 
result in cardholder’s debt in the future.
1 
In this paper, we study the impact of credit card rewards on spending and debt.  We 
explore three questions.  First, do consumers spend more when given rewards?  Second, do 
consumers increase their debt because they receive rewards?  Third, do consumers partially or 
fully offset their increases in spending and debt accumulation by reducing spending and debt on 
their other credit cards?   
We find that consumers generally spend more and increase their debt when offered one 
percent cash-back rewards.  The impact of a relatively small reward generates large spending and 
debt accumulation.  On average, each cardholder receives $25 in cash-back rewards during our 
sample period.  We find that average spending increases by $68 per month and average debt 
increases by over $115 per month in the first quarter after the cash-back reward program starts. 
The greater increase in debt compared to spending suggests that average monthly payment drops 
more than the marginal increase in spending from the cash-back program. Specifically, we find a 
                                                            
1 Many websites offer tips to smartly choose the rewards programs. For example, www.rewardcreditcardsite.com 
suggests the following 7 tips – do not carry a balance, know what “UP TO” means, what the limit, etc.  
 2 
 
reduction of payments within the first quarter of $38 of the start of the program, suggesting that 
the marginal increase in spending due to the cash-back reward is converted into debt along with a 
portion of baseline spending.  Furthermore, evidence from credit bureau data confirms that 
consumers substitute their spending from other cards to the card with cash-back and decrease 
debt on their other cards.  Finally, even in the long run, we find a persistent increase in spending 
and debt.  Specifically, the average spending and debt rise during the nine months subsequent to 
the cash back reward is $76 and $197 per month, respectively.  The reduction in payments is $83 
during the same nine months period.  
We identify certain types of cardholders that are more responsive to the cash-back 
rewards program.  Cardholders that do not carry debt have a larger response to the cash-back 
program.  We find that 11 percent of inactive cardholders during the three months prior to the 
cash-back program used their cards to make purchases of at least $50 in the first month of the 
program.  Specifically, inactive cardholders increase their average per month spending by $220 
during the first quarter and their average per month spending only decreases to $180 during the 
first nine months.  Their average per month increase in debt during the first quarter is $167.  We 
find that these cardholders substitute spending and debt accumulation from other cards to the 
cash-back card.  
Cardholders react differently to cash-back rewards based on some demographic 
characteristics.  Average per month spending increases by $55 by single cardholders and by $95 
by married cardholders during the first quarter.  Similarly, single cardholders increase their 
average per month debt by $65 as compared to $111 by married cardholders during the first 
quarter.  We do not find significant differences between male and female cardholders.  
Cardholders that earn less than $40,000 increase their average per month spending by $47 as 3 
 
compared to $74 for cardholders that earn more than $40,000 during the first quarter of the 
program.  Those earning below $40,000 accumulate $56 additional debt on average per month 
versus $87 for cardholders earning more than $40,000 during the first quarter. 
Credit constraints also impact the response to the cash-back program.  Not surprisingly, 
those cardholders with higher credit limits tend to spend more and accumulate more debt per 
month on average in response to the cash-back program.  Cardholders utilizing less than 50% 
utilization of their credit limits tend to spend more and accumulate more debt per month. 
We are also able to study another tool to increase card usage and debt, albeit more costly, 
to convince cardholders to increase their debt: APR reductions.  During our sample period, the 
financial institution offered certain cardholders a 10 percent APR reduction.  Consistent with 
Gross and Souleles (2002), we find that consumers react to such a large reduction in APRs by 
increasing card spending and debt.  However, we find that only part of this increase in spending 
contributes to an increase in the consumer’s balance for all her credit cards, which suggests that 
consumers shift spending and debt from other cards.  
Our paper incorporates key features from several strands of the literature in economics 
and finance – consumer payment choice, consumption response to income shocks, and 
behavioral finance.  We tie our work to each of these fields and highlight our contribution.  First, 
the literature on payment substitution argues that monetary incentives are effective in enticing 
consumers to use a given payment instrument over another.  While the literature focuses on 
different types of payment instruments, our analysis suggests that these incentives are also 
effective in differentiating providers of the same type of payment instrument.  Second, we 
incorporate findings from the consumption literature that study monetary payouts such as tax 
rebates and their impact on increased spending and debt.  Our results confirm one of the main 4 
 
findings in this literature that only a small financial incentive is required to change consumer 
behavior.  Third, the literature on time-inconsistency suggests that at least some consumers 
increase their spending and debt when offered financial rewards but may incur greater debt than 
expected.  Given our ability to study a cardholder’s overall portfolio, we are able to distinguish 
between increase in spending and debt on a specific card and how that affects a consumer’s 
overall balance sheet.  
In addition, our results also have policy implications.  For instance, the recent regulatory 
and legislative actions have focused attention on the impact of rewards on consumer choice of 
payment instrument and who pays for these rewards.  Some observers have argued that the 
recently passed Card Act and recent changes to overdraft access for debit cards in the United 
States would reduce the ability of issuers to extend rewards.
2  While mandated reduction in 
cardholder fees and finance charges may potentially affect the level of rewards, we find that 
rewards have significant impact on credit card debt especially via substitution from another 
issuer’s credit card suggesting that rewards are an effective tool to steal customers from a 
financial institution’s competitors.  
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2, reviews the literature.  Sections 
3 and 4 outline the data and provide results, respectively.  Finally, section 5 concludes.  
 
2.   Background 
During the past decade, there has been a growing literature documenting the changing 
nature of consumer finance due to the explosive growth of credit card usage. For instance, in 
1970, credit card related consumer debt totaled $2 billion as compared to $626 billion in 2000.  
                                                            
2 For details about the 2010 Card Act, see http://www.federalreserve.gov/consumerinfo/wyntk_creditcardrules.htm. 
For details regarding recent debit card overdraft rules, see 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/consumerinfo/wyntk_overdraft.htm.    5 
 
In 2007, servicing credit card debt (interest plus minimum payments) represented about 14% of 
disposable personal income.  According to Kennickell, Mach, Bucks and Moore (2009), 29 
percent of households with a percentile net worth less than 20 percent carry credit card debt, as 
compared to 38 percent of household with a percentile net worth above 90 percent carry debt.  
Credit cards serve two main purposes.  First, they serve as a payment device in place of cash or 
checks for millions of routine transactions.  Most credit cards have a grace period whereby 
interest charges can be avoided by paying off the outstanding balance in full at the end of the 
month.  Second, they are the primary source of unsecured open-end revolving consumer credit, 
competing with bank loans and other forms of financing.
3  
  The theoretical payment card literature focuses on how the costs of payment cards are 
distributed between banks, merchants and card holders through prices.  These models generally 
conclude that banks may charge fees in excess of their costs to merchants and extend incentives 
to cardholders to increase card adoption and usage (Baxter, 1983; Chakravorti, 2010; Rochet and 
Tirole, 2002).  These models focus on adoption and usage of payment cards vis-à-vis other 
payment instruments.  The results are dependent on various model parameters including the 
degree of competitiveness in the market for goods and payment services along with consumer 
and merchant demand elasticities.  For the most part, this literature does not focus the extension 
of credit.
4 
Debate continues as to who pays for credit card rewards and their social welfare 
implications.  Some U.S. merchants have complained that financial institutions are funding their 
credit card rewards by extracting merchant surplus (Jacob, Jankowski, and Lunn, 2009). 
Theoretical models focus on other funding sources for credit cards rewards.  For example, 
                                                            
3 There are other payment instruments that share these characteristics, e.g. checks and debit cards with overdraft 
protections.  For more discussion about linkages between consumer payment and credit, see Chakravorti (2007).  
4 Bolt and Chakravorti (2008), Chakravorti and To (2007), and Rochet and Wright (2010) are notable exceptions. 6 
 
Chakravorti and Emmons (2003) argue that rewards are funded by those that borrow in the form 
of higher interest rates.  More recently, Schuh, Shy, and Stavins (2010) argue that cash users 
subsidize these rewards because merchants are unable to separate credit card users from other 
payment instrument users by charging more to credit card users.
5   
There is anecdotal evidence from merchants suggesting that rewards are effective in 
convincing consumers to substitute credit cards for debit cards to reduce their payment costs.  
IKEA, a large furniture store operating in several countries, imposed a 70 pence surcharge on 
credit card transactions in their United Kingdom stores resulting in a 15% decrease in credit card 
usage (Bolt et. al, 2010).  Given the relatively high average transaction size at IKEA, only a 
relatively small financial incentive was required to change consumer behavior.  
Some policymakers have intervened in the pricing of payment services to reduce 
consumer incentives to use their credit cards to make purchases especially when consumers do 
not avail the extension of credit.  The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) argued that credit card 
rewards partially funded by fees charged to merchants distorted the efficient choice of payment 
instruments by consumers.  The RBA (2008) estimated the benefit to consumer of using their 
credit cards as purely a payment device as AUS$ 1.30 for each AUS$ 100 spent.  To reduce the 
incentive for consumers to use credit cards, the RBA mandated around a 50 percent reduction in 
the interchange fee (fees paid by merchants’ financial institutions to issuers that are paid for by 
merchants) along with other policy changes.     
Several empirical studies use consumer surveys to study the impact of rewards on 
payment instrument usage (Ching and Hayashi, 2010).  Borzekowski, Kiser and Ahmed (2008) 
                                                            
5 In some cases, merchants are unable to charge different prices based on the type of payment instrument to make 
purchases.  However, in cases where merchants have the ability to do so, few merchants actually set different prices. 
Regardless of the reason, one-price policies may result in cross-subsidies between users of different payment 
instruments.  7 
 
examine survey data on debit card usage and find that financial incentives are effective in 
steering customers to one payment type.  Twenty-one percent of survey respondents cited 
pecuniary reasons for substituting between payment types, and many in this group explicitly 
cited credit card rewards.  Zinman (2009) also observes consumer price sensitivity to payment 
choices.  Specifically, he finds that credit card users with balances are more likely to use their 
debit card because interest accrues immediately after credit card purchases are made.  Our paper 
is the first to empirically test the effect of credit card rewards not only on payment choice but on 
change in spending and debt. 
The consumption literature considers permanent and transitory shocks to consumption. 
Giving consumers cash rewards for spending using a certain device increases their consumption 
because they are receiving money for purchases that they would have made without the 
incentives.  A number of papers have studied consumers' response to a permanent predictable 
change in income, as a means of testing whether households smooth consumption as predicted 
by the rational expectation life-cycle permanent-income hypothesis.  Using credit card data, 
Gross and Souleles (2002) find a marginal propensity to consume of 13% and for accounts that 
had an increase in credit limit.  They also find that debt levels rise by as much as $350.  Souleles 
(1999) finds that consumption responds significantly to the federal income tax refunds that most 
taxpayers receive each spring.  Both of these papers find evidence of liquidity constraints.
6  
Aaronson, Agarwal, and French (2007) find that following a minimum wage hike, households 
with minimum wage workers often buy vehicles.  The size, timing, persistence, composition, and 
distribution of the spending response is inconsistent with the basic certainty equivalent life cycle 
model.  
                                                            
6 Other related studies include Wilcox (1989, 1990), Parker (1999), Souleles (2000, 2002), Browning and Collado 
(2001), Hsieh (2003), and Stephens (2003). 8 
 
There have been four recent studies, using micro data, by Shapiro and Slemrod (2003a 
and 2003b), Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006) and Agarwal, Liu, and Souleles (2007) on the 
2001 tax rebates.  Given the conflicting findings of the consumption literature, we cannot form a 
hypothesis about whether consumption will increase in response to these cash rewards.  
Moreover, our case becomes more complicated when we consider the relationship between the 
rewards and spending.  While a consumer may receive cash for transferring all their spending 
from their debit card to this credit card, she also has an incentive to increase her spending and 
use the credit line attached to the credit card.  Therefore, we look to the behavioral literature to 
find predictions about how a reward program will affect consumers’ overall debt level. 
The seminal paper on time inconsistency is Ausubel (1991) who finds that consumers 
often ignore the interest rate on credit cards because when they make purchases they fully intend 
to pay back but change their mind when the bill comes.  Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, Liu and 
Souleles (2006) find that consumers both under- and over-estimate their spending on the card.  
More recently, behavioral economists have extended this time inconsistency feature in several 
directions (Heidhues and Köszegi, 2010).  Laibson (1997) argues that consumer have self-control 
problems discounting present consumption over future consumption, describing it as “hyperbolic 
discounting.”  This provides an explanation for the first anomaly – increased spending.  A 
potential explanation for the second anomaly – increased debt, can be explained by the “bounded 
rationality” model of Gabaix and Laibson (2000).  It is conceivable that the contract terms and 
conditions are rather complex and over time consumers forget them and use the credit card for 
present consumption.  Ex-post consumers could even justify their mistake as financially 
insignificant or easily fixable since they receive several balance transfer offers on a weekly basis.  9 
 
Therefore, there are several explanations for increased spending, but we can point to “bounded 
rationality” if we observe an increase in overall debt as a result of the program. 
  
3.   Data 
We use a unique, proprietary data set from a large financial institution that issues credit 
cards nationally.  Account level administrative data from a financial institution has a number of 
advantages over consumer survey data.  Relative to traditional household data sets such as the 
Survey of Consumer Finances, our sample is large with little measurement error.  Also, because 
each account is observed over many months, it is possible to study high-frequency dynamics. 
However, using credit card data does entail a number of limitations.  The main unit of analysis is 
a credit card account, not an individual (who can hold multiple accounts).  Unfortunately, we do 
not observe total spending (i.e. spending via cash and checks).   
Our data set contains a representative sample of about 12,000 credit card accounts from 
June 2000 to June 2002 with monthly observations.  For all card accounts, the data on the credit 
card transactions include monthly data from account statements, including spending, repayment, 
balance, debt, APR and credit limit.  In addition to monthly data on credit card use, the data set 
also contains credit card bureau data about the other credit cards held by each account holder, in 
particular the number of other cards and their combined balances.  Unfortunately, credit bureaus 
do not separately record credit card debt, spending and payments – they record only balances.  
The credit card issuer obtained these data from the credit bureaus quarterly.  Finally, there is 
limited demographic data – age and marital status of the cardholders.  Account holders are 
assumed to be married if there is a spouse also listed on the account.  We provide summary 
statistics of all cardholders in Table 1.  10 
 
For approximately half of the data set (6,600 accounts), we also have information 
regarding participation in a cash-back bonus including how much cash back is accrued and 
redeemed.  The cash-back program begins in month 12 of our sample.  The average value 
redeemed is around $10 and the average redemption per account is around $25.  Ninety percent 
of cardholders redeem their cash-back rewards and 85 percent of the value is redeemed.  
In Table 2, we provide summary statistics for the control and treated groups for months 
3-5.  We also looked at the summary statistics for these two groups at other time period and we 
do not observe any systematic patters to suggest any selection of any particular variables.  For 
instance, during these three months, some variables are statistically similar for these two groups 
such as spending, internal behavior and FICO scores, and some demographic characteristics.  
However, some variables such as debt on card, credit line and total overall balance are 
statistically different.  As mentioned before, some cardholders are also part of the APR reduction 
program.  We have also looked at the treated group without these individuals (not reported).  
When these cardholders are excluded, spending, debt, and credit line decrease to levels below the 
control group.  This would suggest that the financial institution does not systematically select a 
group of customers for the reward program.  Based on our conversations with the institution, 
cardholders are not selected on a given criterion to be included in the program.  Moreover, large 
financial institutions are reluctant to prescreen cardholders for such programs due to the potential 
regulatory scrutiny regarding discrimination based on demographic characteristics.  The 
additional cost to make sure such selection is legitimate is significant for issuers.  Finally, if the 
institution had the goal of maximizing revenue, it would have given cash back to all cardholders 
not using their cards.  Giving rewards to cardholders already using their cards with low 
probability of increased usage is costly.  11 
 
In Table 3, we compare the aggregate monthly summary statistics for the treatment group 
during the preceding month before the cash-back program and during the first quarter after the 
program starts.  Note that the average purchase amount increases while the average payment 
amount decreases.  Because all consumers are lumped together across time, these summary 
statistics may not indicate the underlying changes in cardholder behavior. 
Additionally, we have information about an interest rate reduction program that is offered 
to certain individuals.  The month in which cardholders receive reductions in APR is evenly 
distributed during our sample period.  Over half of cardholders have promotional APRs when 
our panel ends.  The average APR reduction is 10%.  Interestingly, all cardholders that receive 
APR reductions are also part of the cash-back program. 
   
4.   Empirical Strategy  
  Our empirical strategy is to quantify consumer responses to financial incentives such as 
cash-back and interest rate reduction programs.  Our dataset allows us to study two different 
programs that the financial institution uses to increase card usage.  In addition to studying the 
impact of card spending and additional debt accrued, we are able to study the impact on the 
cardholder’s overall balances which include additional spending and changes in debt. 
4.1   Cash-back rewards 
We use an event window methodology to study the impact of cash-back incentives 
(Agarwal, Liu, and Souleles (2007)).  The general structure of our OLS regressions is: 
Yit = f (cashbackit, account controls, demographic controls, portfolio controls)  (1) 
Our dependent variable, Yit, represents monthly spending, change in debt, or change in overall 
balance on all credit cards.  Our main explanatory variable, cashbackit, is an indicator variable 12 
 
for cash back.  It is one if the cardholder receives cash back for that month’s purchases and zero 
otherwise.  We compare one month before the cash back is offered to three, six, or nine months 
after the cash-back program has started.
7  Our account control variables are account age, realized 
APR, credit line and the bank’s behavioral score.  Our demographic control variables are marital 
status, gender, income, age and age squared.  Our portfolio controls are from credit bureau data 
and include the individual’s FICO score, sum of all credit card lines, total balance on all credit 
cards, number of other credit cards, and number of other credit cards with balances.  All 
regressions are run with individual fixed effects and clustered standard errors.  
  The expected response to a cash-back reward is to increase spending on the card.  We 
would expect spending to increase for two reasons.  First, cash back may generate additional 
overall spending.  Second, cardholders may substitute this card for purchases made with cash, 
check, debit cards or other credit cards.  
While card issuers earn revenue from merchants indirectly through interchange fees that 
are paid to them by the merchants’ banks, the bulk of issuer income is earned from finance 
charges that accrue when cardholders carry debt.  Similar to spending, cardholders may increase 
their overall debt or substitute credit card borrowing from one card to another. 
  To study spending and debt substitution across credit cards, we estimate the impact of 
cash back on overall credit card balances.  Unlike bank level data, credit bureau data combines 
spending and debt into one variable called total credit card balances.  Thus, overall balances can 
increase because of increased spending and/or additional debt.  Furthermore, we are cautious 
about our results because credit bureau data is only available for our cardholders every quarter.  
                                                            
7 In unreported specifications, we also tried 3 and 6 months before the program.  The results do not show any 
spending or debt responses before the rebate and so we dropped those specification to conserve data.  Additionally, 
in unreported specification, we also ran the same regressions for the control and treated samples together and we do 
not find any spending response for the control sample.  13 
 
  We are also able to compare the impact of cash-back rewards on several different 
subgroups.  First, we compare those cardholders that carry debt and those that do not.  Those that 
do not carry debt can be further divided into two groups—those that use their cards and payoff 
their balances in full every month and those that do not use their cards in the previous three 
months before enrollment in the program.  Second, we consider different demographic 
characteristics such as gender and marital status along with differences in credit limits.  Finally, 
we compare different levels of utilization of credit limits.    
   We also study the impact of a ten percent reduction in the APR on card spending, change 
in card debt, and overall credit card balances. We use the same controls as in the cash-back 
regression along with the same event windows.  Instead of the cashback indicator variable, we 
use an APR reduction indicator variable.  The general structure of our regression becomes: 
Yit = f (APRit, account controls, demographic controls, portfolio controls)     (2) 
 
5. Results 
  In this section, we report our regression results about the impact of the cash-back 
program and the APR reduction program.  All regressions are run with individual fixed effects. 
5.1   Cash Back  
  In Table 4, we report the coefficient on the cash indicator variable for the whole 
treatment group.  Our results indicate that spending increases significantly for all cardholders—
the average consumer increases her spending by over $68 dollars per month during the first 
quarter of being in the cash back program.  The average per month spending continues to 
increase at $76 per month during the first 9 months after the program is introduced.  These 
results are both statistically and economically significant. 14 
 
We also examine the effect of the rewards program on consumers’ incremental debt 
accumulation.  We use the change in cardholder debt as the dependent variable to study the 
impact of the cash-back program.  On average, a consumer increases her debt by $115 per month 
during the first quarter of the cash-back program.  Our results confirm that cardholders not only 
increase spending but also their debt.  The increase in monthly spending and change in debt 
remains relatively constant and continues during the first nine months after the beginning of the 
cash-back program.  We show the complete regression results in appendix tables 1A and 1B. The 
greater increase in debt compared to spending suggests that payments drop not only for 
purchases due to the cash-back reward but also on spending that is not related to the cash-back 
rewards.  Specifically, we find a average monthly reduction in payments within the first quarter 
of $38, suggesting that all the marginal increase in spending due to the cash-back reward is 
converted into debt and a part of the cardholder’s monthly baseline spending is also converted 
into debt.  
  To study the overall impact on the cardholder’s total credit card spending and debt, we 
study the impact of cash back on the total credit card balance as reported by the credit bureaus.  
If the sum of spending and change in card debt is greater than the impact on overall card 
balances, we conclude that the cardholder has substituted some spending and debt from other 
cards to the cash back card.  The change in overall balance only increases by an average of $40 
per month during the first quarter and increases to an average of $76 per month during the first 
nine months.  These results suggest that cardholders have not only substituted spending but also 
debt since their overall credit card balances are lower than both the increases in spending and 
debt.  However, these estimates are not statistically significant.  As mentioned before, the credit 15 
 
bureau data is only available at quarterly intervals making our measurement somewhat 
imprecise.   
  Cardholders differ in how they use their credit cards.  Cardholders may use their cards 
primarily as a payment instrument by paying off their balances in full every month or make 
purchases on credit that they payoff over a longer time horizon.  We would expect these different 
groups to respond to the cash-back incentive program in different ways.  We separate 
cardholders into those that carry debt, commonly referred to as revolvers, and those that do not.  
In Table 5, we study the impact of the cash-back program on cardholders that carry debt from 
month-to-month with those that have zero balances.  In the first quarter of the program, 
cardholders that do not carry debt increase their spending by $138 per month versus $47 per 
month for those cardholders that carry debt during the first quarter.  During the first nine months, 
those cardholders without debt continue to spend more than an average $99 per month and those 
that carry debt increase their spending by an average of $67 per month.  All of these estimates 
are statistically and economically significant.   
  The effect of cash back on change in debt also differs across cardholders (Table 6).  
Those carrying debt, increase their debt by an average of $134 per month during the first quarter 
and by an average of $142 per month during the first nine months after the program starts.  
Those that do not carry debt increase their debt by an average of $114 per month during the first 
quarter and by an average of $211 per month during the first nine months.  Those cardholders 
that do not carry debt substitute spending and debt accumulation on this card from other cards 
(Table 7).  Those that do not carry debt do not increase their overall card balance as a result of 
participating in the cash back program. 16 
 
  To further investigate the impact of no debt cardholders of the cash-back program, we 
separate the “no debt” group into convenience users and inactive cardholders for the three 
months prior to being in the program.  Note that in both cases, cardholders would be categorized 
as zero debt.  About half of cardholders in the treatment group were inactive during the three 
months before being enrolled in the cash-back program.  In Tables 8, 9, and 10, we report our 
results for convenience users and inactive cardholders for the previous three months.  The cash 
back impact on spending is not statistically significant for convenience users (Table 8).  
However, the cash back impact on spending of inactive cardholders prior to the cash-back 
program is statistically and economically significant.  The average per month spending increases 
by $220 during the first quarter and only decreases to $180 on average per month during the first 
nine months of being in the program.  The increase in debt for inactive cardholders prior to the 
cash-back program is statistically and economically significant as well (Table 9).  The average 
monthly change in debt during the first quarter is $167 and the average monthly change in debt 
rises to $196 during the first nine months.  Furthermore, the impact of cash back on overall 
balances suggests that inactive cardholders substituted spending and debt accumulation from 
other cards (Table 10).  We also find evidence that those that inactive users substituted credit 
card balances including spending and change in debt from other cards as they increased spending 
and debt on their cash-back card. 
  In addition, we include some analysis based on demographic characteristics to study the 
impact of the cash-back program.  In Tables 11, we report our results on certain demographic 
characteristics.  Single cardholders increase their spending by $55 on average per month during 
the first quarter whereas married cardholders increase their spending by $95.  Single cardholder 
debt increases by $95 on average per month during the first quarter and rises to $164 during the 17 
 
first nine months after the program is introduced whereas married cardholder debt starts at $155 
and rises to $262, respectively.  The impact of the cash back program on the quarterly change in 
the cardholder’s overall balance is not statistically significant.  The impact of cash back on 
spending and debt is similar for males and females with males being a bit more stable in their 
increase in spending and debt accumulation.   
We divide the treated sample into those that have income below $40,000 and those above 
$40,000 based on what the cardholder reported at the time of application.  We find that those 
with higher income tend to spend more and accumulate more debt in response to being in the 
cash-back program. 
  In Table 12, we report results from considering different levels of credit constraints.  We 
separate our treated group into three different categories of credit limits—below $6,000, between 
$6,000 and $12,000, and above $12,000.  Those with higher credit limits tend to spend more and 
accumulate more debt in response to the cash-back program.  We also divide the sample by two 
levels of credit line utilization—below 50% and above 50%.  We find that cardholders that 
utilize their credit lines 50% or greater spend more and borrow more especially after being in the 
cash-back program for nine months than cardholders who are less credit constrained.  
 
5.2   Interest rate reduction  
We find that on average, consumers increase their spending by an average of $1098 per 
month during the first quarter following an APR reduction (Table 13).  However, this sharply 
drops off to an average of $579 per month during the first nine months after the cardholder is in 
the APR reduction program.  This attenuation suggests that many cardholders transferred 
balances or spending from other credit cards to this one at the beginning of the promotion.  18 
 
Additionally, we find that the change in debt on average increases on average by $1059 during 
the first quarter but falls to $356 during the first nine months suggesting that cardholders are 
substituting debt from higher interest cards to this one with a lower interest rate.  The 
coefficients of the indicator variable of the APR reduction program on the overall credit card 
balance suggests that there is cardholders are exchanging debt from other cards to this card.  
Finally, 24 percent of cardholders that did not use their cards three months prior to the APR 
program used their cards to make at least $50 of purchases during the first month of being 
enrolled in the program. 
 
6.   Conclusion  
  Using statement level data from a large U.S. financial institution, we explored the impact 
of cash-back rewards on credit card spending, debt accumulation, and overall credit bureau 
balances.  Our analysis suggests that cash-back rewards positively and significantly affects 
spending and debt accumulation.  However, overall spending and debt accumulation measured 
by total credit card balances at the credit bureau remain constant or increase slightly suggesting 
that cardholders substitute spending and debt from other credit cards.  Furthermore, the relatively 
small average cardholder redemption of $25 per cardholder makes such a program a cost 
effective tool to increase bank revenue from increased spending and borrowing by cardholders.   
  Cash-back rewards are an effective tool to spur spending and debt accumulation by 
cardholders that hold the institution’s credit cards but do not use them.  This group makes up 
about half of all the cardholders that receive the cash back offer.  Furthermore, the cash-back 
program provides sufficient incentives to 11 percent of inactive cardholders to use their cards. 
The response to cash-back rewards by this group is an increase in average spending of $220 per 19 
 
month during the first quarter and an increase in debt accumulation of close to $167 per month 
during the first quarter.  The cash-back program is generating the greatest revenue from those 
that were not using this card prior to the reward. 
  Our paper sheds light on various aspects of the consumption and payment literature.  Our 
results support that financial incentives need not be large to generate significant shifts in 
consumer behavior.  While not the main focus of our paper, we are unable to rule out time 
inconsistency issues arising from payment substitution and increases in incremental cardholder 
spending.  A more complete view of the cardholders debt portfolio and monthly expenditures 
would be necessary to explore this issue further.  Finally, we consider an alternative view as to 
why financial institutions issue rewards.  Much of the theoretical payment card literature 
suggests that financial incentives may be necessary to gain adoption of a payment instrument. 
Others have suggested that credit card rewards are a form of surplus extraction.  Our analysis 
suggests that in an extremely competitive credit card issuing market, rewards are another tool 
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SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR ALL OBSERVATIONS (N=261435) 
        
        M e a n    S t a n d a r d   D e v i a t i o n  
Account Characteristics 
Spending   220 790 
Debt on Card  2610 3045 
Internal Behavioral Score  712 30 
Account Age (years)  4 3 
Credit Line  8509 3280 
Realized APR  15.37% 6.70% 
Did Not Use  
(1=Not spending before the program)  50.07% 50.00% 
Revolver  
(1=Carrying debt before the program)  70.72% 45.51% 
 
Credit Characteristics 
FICO Score  731 46
Total Balance on All Credit Cards  10007 13603
Total Credit Cards with Debt  3 3





Gender (male=1, female=0)  52.35% 49.95%
Married (Spouse Listed=1, No Spouse Listed=0)  33.49% 47.20%
 
Notes: The data come from the monthly billing statement of credit card accounts, and attached credit bureaus. All 





SUMMARY STATISTICS BY TREATMENT AND CONTROL GROUP 
Months 3-5 
 
                   Control (N=14209)    Treatment (N=19430) 
                                    Mean      Standard Deviation         Mean     Standard Deviation 
 
Account Characteristics 
Spending 244 707 257  1075 
Debt on Card  2139 2810 3541  3085 
Internal Behavioral Score  718 38 716  24 
Account Age  4 3 3  3 
Credit Line  7494 3205 8569  2831 
Did Not Use  
(1=Not spending before the program)  35.3% 47.8% 61.1% 48.8% 
Revolver  
(1=Carrying debt before the program)  63.0% 48.3% 76.4% 42.4% 
   
Credit Characteristics 
FICO Score  724 56 737  33
Total Balance on All Credit Cards  8625 12766 9916  12766
Total Credit Cards with Debt  3 3 3  3
Total Number of Credit Cards  4 4 5  4
 
Demographics 
Income 57755 71005 58351  103033 
Age 46 13 48  13 
Gender  
(male=1, female=0)  52.28% 49.95% 52.68% 49.93% 
Married  
(Spouse Listed=1, No Spouse Listed=0)  32.99% 47.02% 33.83% 47.31% 
 
Notes: The data come from the monthly billing statement of credit card accounts, and attached credit bureaus. All 




SUMMARY STATISTICS BEFORE AND AFTER TREATMENT IN TREATMENT GROUP 
Months 11-14 
 
              Before (N=7037)                After (N=12504) 
                  Mean    Standard Deviation           Mean   Standard Deviation 
 
Account Characteristics 
Spending 159 652 203  915
Debt on Card  2716 3048 2772  3099
Internal Behavioral Score  703 19 702  18
Account Age  4 3 4  3
Credit Line  9217 2897 9268  2949
 
Credit Characteristics 
FICO Score  738 33 739  32 
Total Balance on All Credit Cards  10553 13692 11255  13819 
Total Credit Cards with Debt  3 3 3  3 
Total Number of Credit Cards  5 4 6  4 
 
Demographics 
Income 59104 100510 57819  104200 
Age 48 13 49  13 
Gender  
(male=1, female=0)  53.17% 49.91% 52.55% 49.94% 
Married  
(Spouse Listed=1,  
No Spouse Listed=0)  34.56% 47.56% 33.24% 47.11% 
 
Notes: The data come from the monthly billing statement of credit card accounts, and attached credit bureaus. All 
values are averaged over the sample period (May to August 2001). 
   
 
TABLE 4 
Effects of Bonus Program within Treatment Group  
Spending 
               3 Months (N=24308)          6 Months (N=40633)             9 Months (N=55989)       
                      Coeffic Standard T-Stat                             Coeffic Standard  T-Stat                          Coeffic Standard  T-Stat                
                Error                           Error                                  Error                
Cashback Indicator  
(Receiving Cashback=1)  68.41 12.73 5.37 80.43 10.76 7.47 76.14 10.18 7.48
 
Change in Debt 
            3 Months (N=21675)          6 Months (N=35764)             9 Months (N=48487)       
                  Coeffic Standard T-Stat                            Coeffic Standard  T-Stat                          Coeffic Standard  T-Stat                
                          Error                           Error                                  Error                 
Cashback Indicator  
(Receiving Cashback=1)  114.85 25.05 4.58 177.43 20.77 8.54 197.08 19.22 10.26
 
Change in Total Balance Across Cards 
            3 Months (N=24308)          6 Months (N=40633)             9 Months (N=55989)       
                  Coeffic Standard T-Stat                            Coeffic Standard  T-Stat                          Coeffic Standard  T-Stat                
                          Error                           Error                                   Error                
Cashback Indicator  
(Receiving Cashback=1)  40.26 56.91 0.71 56.25  59.96 0.94 66.60 60.29 1.10
 
 
Notes: This table reports the coefficient value, the standard error, and the t-statistics for the cashback indicator variable in equation (1) for the three regressions of 
spending, change in debt, and change in credit bureau balances for 3, 6, and 9 months respectively. All values are in current dollars (2000-2002). Each regression 
also includes a full set of controls – the quarterly change in FICO and internal behavioral scores, account age, the APR that the consumer pays, credit limit, total 
balance from the credit bureau (except in equations estimated effect on change in total balance across cards), number of other credit lines from the credit bureau, 
number of other cards with debt from the credit bureau, an indicator for married, age and age squared. The results control for individual fixed effects and 







Effects of Bonus Program on Spending if Cardholder Carries Debt  
Panelists that DO NOT have Debt Before the Program Starts 
              3 Months (N=5286)            6 Months (N=8142)           9 Months (N=11016)          
                    Coeffic Standard  T-Stat                    Coeffic Standard  T-Stat                 Coeffic Standard  T-Stat          
                                   Error                          Error                            Error      
Cashback Indicator  
(Receiving Cashback=1)  138.16 28.02 4.93 119.42 23.01 5.19 98.73 22.28 4.43
 
Panelists that DO have Debt Before the Program Starts 
3 Months (N=19022)                6 Months (N=32491)             9 Months (N=44973)                
                             Coeffic Standard  T-Stat                          Coeffic  Standard T-Stat          Coeffic  Standard  T-Stat              
               Error                                  Error                       Error              
Cashback Indicator  
(Receiving Cashback=1)  47.47 14.21 3.34 69.11  12.28 5.63 66.69 11.59 5.76
 
Notes: This table reports the coefficient value, the standard error, and the t-statistics for the cashback indicator variable in equation (1) for the three regressions 
of spending, change in debt, and change in credit bureau balances for 3, 6, and 9 months respectively. All values are in current dollars (2000-2002). Each 
regression also includes a full set of controls – the quarterly change in FICO and internal behavioral scores, account age, the APR that the consumer pays, 
credit limit, total balance from the credit bureau, number of other credit lines from the credit bureau, number of other cards with debt from the credit bureau, an 
indicator for married, age and age squared. The results control for individual fixed effects and clustered standard errors that are adjusted for heteroscedasticity 




Effects of Bonus Program on Change in Debt if Cardholder Carries Debt  
Panelists that DO NOT have Debt Before the Program Starts 
              3 Months (N=4002)          6 Months (N=5868)           9 Months (N=7521)          
                   Coeffic Standard  T-Stat              Coeffic Standard  T-Stat                  Coeffic Standard  T-Stat          
                                  Error                        Error                              Error      
Cashback Indicator  
(Receiving Cashback=1)  133.92 28.80 4.65 137.37 23.61 5.82 142.61 21.48 6.64
 
 
Panelists that DO have Debt Before the Program Starts 
3 Months (N=17672)              6 Months (N=29896)             9 Months (N=40966)                
                            Coeffic Standard  T-Stat              Coeffic  Standard T-Stat           Coeffic  Standard  T-Stat              
               Error                                Error                       Error                
Cashback Indicator  
(Receiving Cashback=1)  114.04 30.19 3.78 190.61 24.87 7.66 210.89 22.97 9.18
 
Notes: This table reports the coefficient value, the standard error, and the t-statistics for the cashback indicator variable in equation (1) for the three regressions of 
spending, change in debt, and change in credit bureau balances for 3, 6, and 9 months respectively. All values are in current dollars (2000-2002). Each regression 
also includes a full set of controls – the quarterly change in FICO and internal behavioral scores, account age, the APR that the consumer pays, credit limit, total 
balance from the credit bureau, number of other credit lines from the credit bureau, number of other cards with debt from the credit bureau, an indicator for 
married, age and age squared. The results control for individual fixed effects and clustered standard errors that are adjusted for heteroscedasticity across 
individuals and correlation within. 29 
 
TABLE 7 
Effects of Bonus Program on Quarterly Change in Total Balance if Cardholder Carries Debt  
Panelists that DO NOT have Debt Before the Program Starts 
              3 Months (N=5286)          6 Months (N=8142)           9 Months (N=11016)          
                    Coeffic Standard  T-Stat              Coeffic Standard  T-Stat                  Coeffic Standard  T-Stat          
                                   Error                               Error                        Error                
Cashback Indicator  
(Receiving Cashback=1)  293.49 122.26 2.40 371.35 129.36 2.87 466.37 136.03 3.43
 
Panelists that DO have Debt Before the Program Starts 
3 Months (N=19022)              6 Months (N=32491)            9 Months (N=44973)                 
                            Coeffic Standard  T-Stat               Coeffic  Standard T-Stat          Coeffic  Standard  T-Stat              
                          Error                                   Error                                 Error                
Cashback Indicator  
(Receiving Cashback=1)  -12.35 64.71 -0.19 -20.19  66.08 -0.31 -18.99 68.31 -0.28
 
 
Notes: This table reports the coefficient value, the standard error, and the t-statistics for the cashback indicator variable in equation (1) for the three regressions of 
spending, change in debt, and change in credit bureau balances for 3, 6, and 9 months respectively. All values are in current dollars (2000-2002). Each regression 
also includes a full set of controls – the quarterly change in FICO and internal behavioral scores, account age, the APR that the consumer pays, credit limit, 
number of other credit lines from the credit bureau, number of other cards with debt from the credit bureau, an indicator for married, age and age squared. The 
results control for individual fixed effects and clustered standard errors that are adjusted for heteroscedasticity across individuals and correlation within. 30 
 
TABLE 8 
Effects of Bonus Program on Spending by Convenience and Inactive Users  
Convenience Users Before the Program Starts 
              3 Months (N=2113)            6 Months (N=3288)           9 Months (N=4417)          
                    Coeffic Standard  T-Stat                    Coeffic Standard  T-Stat                 Coeffic Standard  T-Stat          
                                   Error                          Error                            Error      
Cashback Indicator  
(Receiving Cashback=1)  26.86 44.41 0.60 -14.77 40.09 -.37 -28.83 38.93 -.74
 
 
Inactive Users Before the Program Starts 
3 Months (N=3095)                6 Months (N=4692)             9 Months (N=6248)                 
                             Coeffic Standard  T-Stat                          Coeffic  Standard T-Stat          Coeffic  Standard  T-Stat              
               Error                                  Error                       Error              
Cashback Indicator  
(Receiving Cashback=1)  219.61 38.16 5.75 205.97 27.67 7.44 180.24 26.73 6.74
 
Notes: This table reports the coefficient value, the standard error, and the t-statistics for the cashback indicator variable in equation (1) for the three regressions of 
spending, change in debt, and change in credit bureau balances for 3, 6, and 9 months respectively. All values are in current dollars (2000-2002). Each regression 
also includes a full set of controls – the quarterly change in FICO and internal behavioral scores, account age, the APR that the consumer pays, credit limit, total 
balance from the credit bureau, number of other credit lines from the credit bureau, number of other cards with debt from the credit bureau, an indicator for 
married, age and age squared. The results control for individual fixed effects and clustered standard errors that are adjusted for heteroscedasticity across 




Effects of Bonus Program on Change in Debt by Convenience and Inactive Users 
Convenience Users Before the Program Starts 
              3 Months (N=1624)          6 Months (N=2445)           9 Months (N=3129)          
                   Coeffic Standard  T-Stat              Coeffic Standard  T-Stat                  Coeffic Standard  T-Stat          
                                  Error                        Error                              Error      
Cashback Indicator  
(Receiving Cashback=1)  95.32 34.65 2.75 81.13 31.25  2.60 80.19 23.97 3.35
 
Inactive Users Before the Program Starts 
3 Months (N=2318)              6 Months (N=3312)             9 Months (N=4193)                
                             Coeffic Standard  T-Stat             Coeffic  Standard T-Stat           Coeffic  Standard  T-Stat              
               Error                                Error                       Error               
Cashback Indicator  
(Receiving Cashback=1)  166.66 45.63 3.65 186.38 34.74 5.36 196.15 33.62 5.83
 
Notes: This table reports the coefficient value, the standard error, and the t-statistics for the cashback indicator variable in equation (1) for the three regressions of 
spending, change in debt, and change in credit bureau balances for 3, 6, and 9 months respectively. All values are in current dollars (2000-2002). Each regression 
also includes a full set of controls – the quarterly change in FICO and internal behavioral scores, account age, the APR that the consumer pays, credit limit, total 
balance from the credit bureau, number of other credit lines from the credit bureau, number of other cards with debt from the credit bureau, an indicator for 
married, age and age squared. The results control for individual fixed effects and clustered standard errors that are adjusted for heteroscedasticity across 
individuals and correlation within. 32 
 
TABLE 10 
Effects of Bonus Program on Quarterly Change in Total Balance by Convenience and Inactive Users 
Convenience Users Before the Program Starts 
              3 Months (N=2113)          6 Months (N=3288)           9 Months (N=4417)          
                    Coeffic Standard  T-Stat              Coeffic Standard  T-Stat                  Coeffic Standard  T-Stat          
                                   Error                               Error                        Error                
Cashback Indicator  
(Receiving Cashback=1)  244.38 183.82 1.33 310.55 189.16 1.64 239.83 186.43 1.29
 
Inactive Users Before the Program Starts 
3 Months (N=3095)              6 Months (N=4692)            9 Months (N=6248)                 
                            Coeffic Standard  T-Stat               Coeffic  Standard T-Stat          Coeffic  Standard  T-Stat              
                          Error                                   Error                                 Error                
Cashback Indicator  
(Receiving Cashback=1)  276.80 159.70 1.73 368.05 182.38 2.02 594.36 197.72 3.01
 
Notes: This table reports the coefficient value, the standard error, and the t-statistics for the cashback indicator variable in equation (1) for the three regressions of 
spending, change in debt, and change in credit bureau balances for 3, 6, and 9 months respectively. All values are in current dollars (2000-2002). Each regression 
also includes a full set of controls – the quarterly change in FICO and internal behavioral scores, account age, the APR that the consumer pays, credit limit, 
number of other credit lines from the credit bureau, number of other cards with debt from the credit bureau, an indicator for married, age and age squared. The 




Only Coefficients for Cashback Indicator Variable are Reported 
Single Married  Male  Female  Income<$40k    Income>$40k
 
 
Spending 3  55.34***  95.06***  47.01**  70.50***  47.06**  73.94*** 
6 65.06***  110.80***  78.38***  83.85***  56.28***  87.03*** 
9 59.47***  108.05***  80.82***  76.17***  57.74***  81.13*** 
Change in Debt  3  95.05***  155.03***  71.28  83.85  99.96**  119.31*** 
6 150.54***  230.87***  137.58***  158.41***  137.05***  187.82*** 
9 163.61***  261.83***  170.11***  177.15***  152.96***  208.58*** 
Quarterly Change 
in Total Balance  3  56.08  7.73  -12.79  169.50  30.75  36.31 
6 90.01  -3.86  -74.66  248.72**  47.50  54.46 
9 113.80  -19.04  -22.53  235.03  40.82  67.38 
 
 
Notes: This table reports the coefficient value, the standard error, and the t-statistics for the cashback indicator variable in equation (1) for the three regressions of 
spending, change in debt, and change in credit bureau balances for 3, 6, and 9 months respectively. All values are in current dollars (2000-2002). Each regression 
also includes a full set of controls – the quarterly change in FICO and internal behavioral scores, account age, the APR that the consumer pays, credit limit, total 
balance from the credit bureau (except in equations estimated effect on change in total balance across cards), number of other credit lines from the credit bureau, 
number of other cards with debt from the credit bureau, an indicator for married, age and age squared. The results control for individual fixed effects and 




Only Coefficients for Cashback Indicator Variable are Reported 
Credit Limit     Credit Limit   Credit Limit        Percent Utilization         Percent Utilization 
Less than $6k       $6-12k        > $12k      <50%       >50% 
Spending 3  30.25  69.33***  91.72**  17.41  36.27* 
6 32.12**  78.05***  105.06***  26.23***  94.46*** 
9 23.68  77.38***  96.12***  24.09***  124.64*** 
Change in Debt  3  68.06  108.77***  184.97**  69.86  4.78** 
6 94.65***  160.66***  256.74***  109.60*** 129.92*** 
9 108.78***  166.57***  290.52***  119.97***  188.35*** 
Quarterly Change 
in Total Balance  3  -176.00  45.11  189.67  61.24  -68.48 
6 -226.50  34.40  270.73* 58.29  -16.41 
9 -82.03  21.91 297.52**  26.98  23.77 
 
Notes: This table reports the coefficient value, the standard error, and the t-statistics for the cashback indicator variable in equation (1) for the three regressions of 
spending, change in debt, and change in credit bureau balances for 3, 6, and 9 months respectively. All values are in current dollars (2000-2002). Each regression 
also includes a full set of controls – the quarterly change in FICO and internal behavioral scores, account age, the APR that the consumer pays, credit limit, total 
balance from the credit bureau (except in equations estimated effect on change in total balance across cards), number of other credit lines from the credit bureau, 
number of other cards with debt from the credit bureau, an indicator for married, age and age squared. The results control for individual fixed effects and 




Effects of APR Reduction within Treatment Group  
 
Spending 
          3 Months (N=4633)           6 Months (N=7721)                 9 Months (N=10298)           
            Coeffic Standard  T-Stat                        Coeffic  Standard  T-Stat                  Coeffic Standard  T-Stat              
                    Error                       Error                        Error                
APR Reduction Indicator 
(Receiving APR Reduction=1)  1097.79 84.80 12.95 822.98 55.40 14.86 578.63 44.30 13.06
 
 
Change in Debt 
          3 Months (N=4022)           6 Months (N=6687)                 9 Months (N=8932)          
            Coeffic  Standard  T-Stat                     Coeffic  Standard  T-Stat                  Coeffic  Standard  T-Stat           
                      Error                      Error                         Error                
APR Reduction Indicator 
(Receiving APR Reduction=1)  1058.65 117.51 9.01 660.48 89.70 7.36 355.94 69.39 5.13
 
Change in Total Balance 
          3 Months (N=4633)           6 Months (N=7721)                 9 Months (N=10298)           
            Coeffic  Standard  T-Stat                     Coeffic  Standard  T-Stat                  Coeffic  Standard  T-Stat              
                      Error                      Error                         Error                
APR Reduction Indicator 
(Receiving APR Reduction=1)  636.15 432.67 1.47 604.08 288.07 2.10 586.55 263.30 2.23
 
Notes: This table reports the coefficient value, the standard error, and the t-statistics for the APR reduction indicator variable in equation (1) for the three 
regressions of spending, change in debt, and change in credit bureau balances for 3, 6, and 9 months respectively. All values are in current dollars (2000-2002). 
Each regression also includes a full set of controls – the quarterly change in FICO and internal behavioral scores, account age, the APR that the consumer pays, 
credit limit, total balance from the credit bureau (except in equations estimated effect on change in total balance across cards), number of other credit lines from 
the credit bureau, number of other cards with debt from the credit bureau, an indicator for married, age and age squared. The results control for individual fixed 




VARIABLE INDEX  
 
Last Balance  Measure of Debt 
Purchase Amount  Sum of Purchases made that month 
Payment Amount  Sum of repayments made that month 
FICO Score  FICO score from Credit Bureau 
Internal Behavioral Score  Internal Score from bank 
Account Age  Number of years account open 
APR  Annual Percentage Rate 
Realized APR   APR that the consumer faces (reflects promotional APR from 
bank) 
Credit Line  Credit Available on the account 
Total Balance Across Cards  Sum of Balances reported by the Credit Bureau  
Total Number of Cards with Debt   Total Number of Cards with Debt reported by the Credit Bureau 
Total Number of Credit Lines  Total Number of card held by individual reported by the Credit 
Bureau 
Income  Individual Income reported by the bank 
Age  Age of individual 
Age^2  Age of individual squared 
Gender  =1 for male, =0 for female, missing if unknown 
Marital Status  =1 if a spouse is listed on the count, =0 if spouse not listed 
Cash Back Indicator  =1 if receiving cash back promotion from the bank, =0 if not 
FICO Change that Quarter  Behavioral Score at t - Behavioral Score at t-1 
Internal Score Change that Quarter  Internal Score at t - Internal Score at t-1 
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Appendix - TABLE 1A 
Effects of Bonus Program on Spending and Change in Debt in Treatment Group 
1 Month Before the Program Starts, 3 Months After 
Spending (N=24308) 
Variable                Coefficient      Standard Error      T-Stat 
Cashback Dummy  
(Receiving Cashback=1, Not in Program=0)  68.41 12.73 5.37
Change in Behavior Score from Previous Quarter  -1.69 0.47  -3.60
Change in FICO Score from Previous Quarter  -0.58 0.44  -1.32
Account Age  24.74 31.69  0.78
Realized APR  -42.18 5.94  -7.10
Credit Line  0.03 0.02  1.74
Total Balance on All Credit Cards  0.00 0.00  -0.53
Total Credit Cards with Debt  15.65 15.72  1.00
Total Number of Credit Cards  -4.46 18.09  -0.25
Age 116.73 100.63  1.16
Age^2 -1.26 0.92  -1.36
 
 
Change in Debt (N=21674) 
 
Variable                  Coefficient     Standard Error       T-Stat 
Cashback Dummy  
(Receiving Cashback=1, Not in Program=0)  114.85 25.05 4.58
Change in Behavior Score from Previous Quarter  -13.26 1.23  -10.81
Change in FICO Score from Previous Quarter  -0.11 0.78  -0.14
Account Age  104.02 51.97  2.00
Realized APR  -43.94 8.65  -5.08
Credit Line  0.21 0.06  3.39
Total Balance on All Credit Cards  0.00 0.01  -0.12
Total Credit Cards with Debt  18.04 25.88  0.70
Total Number of Credit Cards  7.48 27.17  0.28
Age 372.44 168.57  2.21
Age^2 -3.53 1.58  -2.24
 
Notes: This table reports the coefficient value, the standard error, and the t-statistics for the cashback indicator 
variable in equation (1) for change in debt for the period 1 month before and 3 months after the program starts. All 
values are in current dollars (2000-2002). The results control for individual fixed effects and clustered standard 
errors that are adjusted for heteroscedasticity across individuals and correlation within. 
  38 
 
Appendix - TABLE 1B 
 
Effects of Bonus Program on Quarterly Change in Total Balance in Treatment Group 
1 Month Before the Program Starts, 3 Months After 
Quarterly Change in Total Balance (N=24308) 
 
Variable                   Coefficient   Standard Error     T-Stat 
Cashback Dummy  
(Receiving Cashback=1, Not in Program=0)  40.26 56.91 0.71
Change in Behavior Score from Previous Quarter  5.52 3.63  1.52
Change in FICO Score from Previous Quarter  60.56 4.25  14.26
Account Age  -16.16 205.74  -0.08
Realized APR  -18.81 25.55  -0.74
Credit Line  -0.04 0.09  -0.46
Total Credit Cards with Debt  1239.07 268.33  4.62
Total Number of Credit Cards  258.50 131.63  1.96
Age -144.76 521.02  -0.28
Age^2 1.33 5.27  0.25
 
 
Notes: This table reports the coefficient value, the standard error, and the t-statistics for the cashback indicator 
variable in equation (1) for change in debt for the period 1 month before and 3 months after the program starts. All 
values are in current dollars (2000-2002). The results control for individual fixed effects and clustered standard 
errors that are adjusted for heteroscedasticity across individuals and correlation within. 
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Appendix - TABLE 2 
Effects of Bonus Program on Spending for those that Do Not have Debt Prior to the Program 
1 Month Before the Program Starts, 3 Months After 
Spending (N=5286) 
 
Variable               Coefficient     Standard Error     T-Stat 
Cashback Dummy  
(Receiving Cashback=1, Not in Program=0)  138.16 28.02 4.93
Change in Behavior Score from Previous 
Quarter -2.19 1.07  -2.06
Change in FICO Score from Previous Quarter  0.10 1.11  0.09
Account Age  -69.87 95.58  -0.73
Realized APR  -49.85 7.98  -6.25
Credit Line  0.01 0.02  0.61
Total Balance on All Credit Cards  0.00 0.01  -0.38
Total Credit Cards with Debt  32.16 25.79  1.25
Total Number of Credit Cards  -30.77 37.50  -0.82
Age 17.70 188.52  0.09
Age^2 -0.17 1.70  -0.10
 
Effects of Bonus Program on Spending for those that DO have debt prior to the program  
1 Month Before the Program Starts, 3 Months After 
Spending (N=19022) 
Variable                     Coefficient   Standard Error               T-Stat 
Cashback Dummy  
(Receiving Cashback=1, Not in Program=0)  47.47 14.21  3.34
Change in Behavior Score from Previous Quarter  -1.48 0.52  -2.82
Change in FICO Score from Previous Quarter  -0.76 0.45  -1.69
Account Age  47.37 32.58  1.45
Realized APR  -38.25 7.96  -4.81
Credit Line  0.03 0.02  1.72
Total Balance on All Credit Cards  0.00 0.01  -0.46
Total Credit Cards with Debt  9.50 19.32  0.49
Total Number of Credit Cards  4.19 20.83  0.20
Age 140.81 117.79  1.20
Age^2 -1.53 1.08  -1.42
 
Notes: This table reports the coefficient value, the standard error, and the t-statistics for the cashback indicator variable in 
equation (1) for spending for the period 1 month before and 3 months after the program starts. All values are in current dollars 
(2000-2002). The results control for individual fixed effects and clustered standard errors that are adjusted for heteroscedasticity 
across individuals and correlation within.   40 
 
Appendix - TABLE 3 
Effects of Bonus Program on Change in Debt for those that Do Not have Debt Prior to the Program 
1 Month Before the Program Starts, 3 Months After 
Change in Debt (N=4002) 
Variable                 Coefficient   Standard Error    T-Stat 
Cashback Dummy  
(Receiving Cashback=1, Not in Program=0)  133.92 28.80 4.65
Change in Behavior Score from Previous 
Quarter -6.58 1.90  -3.46
Change in FICO Score from Previous Quarter  -0.36 1.72  -0.21
Account Age  2.23 83.98  0.03
Realized APR  -47.16 9.16  -5.15
Credit Line  0.01 0.09  0.08
Total Balance on All Credit Cards  0.01 0.01  0.78
Total Credit Cards with Debt  -2.78 19.30  -0.14
Total Number of Credit Cards  21.51 21.45  1.00
Age 215.12 242.56  0.89
Age^2 -1.65 2.06  -0.80
 
 
Effects of Bonus Program on Change in Debt for those that DO have debt prior to the program  
1 Month Before the Program Starts, 3 Months After 
Change in Debt (N=17672) 
Variable                 Coefficient    Standard Error    T-Stat 
Cashback Dummy  
(Receiving Cashback=1, Not in Program=0)  114.04 30.19 3.78
Change in Behavior Score from Previous Quarter  -14.62 1.41  -10.37
Change in FICO Score from Previous Quarter  0.02 0.87  0.02
Account Age  130.84 59.01  2.22
Realized APR  -42.37 11.71  -3.62
Credit Line  0.23 0.07  3.50
Total Balance on All Credit Cards  0.00 0.01  -0.40
Total Credit Cards with Debt  26.12 33.68  0.78
Total Number of Credit Cards  3.01 34.51  0.09
Age 400.05 199.36  2.01
Age^2 -3.82 1.86  -2.05
 
Notes: This table reports the coefficient value, the standard error, and the t-statistics for the cashback indicator 
variable in equation (1) for spending for the period 1 month before and 3 months after the program starts. All values 
are in current dollars (2000-2002).  The results control for individual fixed effects and clustered standard errors that 
are adjusted for heteroscedasticity across individuals and correlation within.  41 
 
Appendix - TABLE 4 
Effects of Bonus Program on Quarterly Change in Total Balance for those that Do Not have Debt Prior to 
the Program 
1 Month Before the Program Starts, 3 Months After 
Change in Total Balance (N=5286) 
Variable                 Coefficient   Standard Error    T-Stat 
Cashback Dummy  
(Receiving Cashback=1, Not in Program=0)  293.49 122.26 2.40
Change in Behavior Score from Previous Quarter  20.32 8.63  2.36
Change in FICO Score from Previous Quarter  63.74 9.94  6.41
Account Age  746.88 623.35  1.20
Realized APR  49.79 42.98  1.16
Credit Line  0.12 0.15  0.81
Total Credit Cards with Debt  1797.16 607.02  2.96
Total Number of Credit Cards  52.46 270.52  0.19
Age 1734.26 1396.63  1.24
Age^2 -14.41 13.79  -1.05
 
 
Effects of Bonus Program on Change in Debt for those that DO have debt prior to the program  
1 Month Before the Program Starts, 3 Months After 
Change in Total Balance (N=19022) 
Variable                 Coefficient   Standard Error    T-Stat 
Cashback Dummy  
(Receiving Cashback=1, Not in Program=0)  -12.35 64.71 -0.19
Change in Behavior Score from Previous Quarter  2.62 4.00  0.66
Change in FICO Score from Previous Quarter  60.41 4.65  13.00
Account Age  -149.95 209.92  -0.71
Realized APR  -49.82 31.75  -1.57
Credit Line  -0.07 0.11  -0.63
Total Credit Cards with Debt  951.42 119.23  7.98
Total Number of Credit Cards  376.15 103.49  3.63
Age -706.11 540.85  -1.31
Age^2 6.42 5.53  1.16
 
Notes: This table reports the coefficient value, the standard error, and the t-statistics for the cashback indicator 
variable in equation (1) for spending for the period 1 month before and 3 months after the program starts. All values 
are in current dollars (2000-2002). The results control for individual fixed effects and clustered standard errors that 
are adjusted for heteroscedasticity across individuals and correlation within. 
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Appendix - TABLE 5 
Effects of Bonus Program on Spending for those that Do Not have Debt and Use the Card Prior to the 
program  
1 Month Before the Program Starts, 3 Months After 
Spending (N=2113) 
Variable                  Coefficient         Standard Error      T-Stat 
Cashback Dummy  
(Receiving Cashback=1, Not in Program=0)  26.86 44.41 0.60
Change in Behavior Score from Previous Quarter  -1.94 1.30  -1.49
Change in FICO Score from Previous Quarter  -0.65 1.21  -0.54
Account Age  -49.09 115.12  -0.43
Realized APR  -30.80 14.61  -2.11
Credit Line  0.01 0.03  0.34
Total Balance on All Credit Cards  -0.01 0.01  -0.64
Total Credit Cards with Debt  97.62 54.32  1.80
Total Number of Credit Cards  -156.33 98.99  -1.58
Age 172.60 174.06  0.99
Age^2 -1.70 1.61  -1.05
 
 
Effects of Bonus Program on Spending for those that Do Not have Debt and DO Not Use the Card Prior 
to the program  
1 Month Before the Program Starts, 3 Months After 
Spending (N=3095) 
Variable                   Coefficient   Standard Error    T-Stat 
Cashback Dummy  
(Receiving Cashback=1, Not in Program=0)  219.61 38.16 5.75
Change in Behavior Score from Previous Quarter  -2.75 1.70  -1.62
Change in FICO Score from Previous Quarter  0.65 1.64  0.40
Account Age  -76.57 145.01  -0.53
Realized APR  -56.47 9.44  -5.98
Credit Line  0.01 0.03  0.39
Total Balance on All Credit Cards  0.00 0.01  0.05
Total Credit Cards with Debt  4.99 28.28  0.18
Total Number of Credit Cards  24.96 25.38  0.98
Age -153.03 293.05  -0.52
Age^2 1.66 2.64  0.63
 
Notes: This table reports the coefficient value, the standard error, and the t-statistics for the cashback indicator 
variable in equation (1) for spending for the period 1 month before and 3 months after the program starts. All values 
are in current dollars (2000-2002).  The results control for individual fixed effects and clustered standard errors that 
are adjusted for heteroscedasticity across individuals and correlation within.   43 
 
Appendix - TABLE 6 
Effects of Bonus Program on Change in Debt for those that Do Not have Debt and Use the Card Prior to 
the program  
1 Month Before the Program Starts, 3 Months After 
Change in Debt (N=1624) 
Variable         Coefficient    Standard  Error  T-Stat 
Cashback Dummy  
(Receiving Cashback=1, Not in Program=0)  95.32 34.65 2.75
Change in Behavior Score from Previous Quarter  -4.12 1.85  -2.23
Change in FICO Score from Previous Quarter  -2.38 1.56  -1.53
Account Age  -90.39 47.73  -1.89
Realized APR  -33.22 17.72  -1.88
Credit Line  -0.04 0.15  -0.29
Total Balance on All Credit Cards  0.01 0.01  1.31
Total Credit Cards with Debt  17.77 26.15  0.68
Total Number of Credit Cards  -9.82 29.49  -0.33
Age 156.84 320.51  0.49
Age^2 -1.75 2.77  -0.63
 
 
Effects of Bonus Program on Change in Debt for those that Do Not have Debt and DO Not Use the Card 
Prior to the program  
1 Month Before the Program Starts, 3 Months After 
Change in Debt (N=2318) 
Variable                  Coefficient    Standard  Error    T-Stat 
Cashback Dummy  
(Receiving Cashback=1, Not in Program=0)  166.66 45.63 3.65
Change in Behavior Score from Previous Quarter  -9.29 3.28  -2.84
Change in FICO Score from Previous Quarter  0.72 2.54  0.28
Account Age  63.39 138.35  0.46
Realized APR  -51.64 10.70  -4.82
Credit Line  0.08 0.11  0.72
Total Balance on All Credit Cards  0.00 0.01  0.41
Total Credit Cards with Debt  -12.47 26.44  -0.47
Total Number of Credit Cards  29.70 29.52  1.01
Age 155.98 343.55  0.45
Age^2 -0.27 2.94  -0.09
 
Notes: This table reports the coefficient value, the standard error, and the t-statistics for the cashback indicator 
variable in equation (1) for spending for the period 1 month before and 3 months after the program starts. All values 
are in current dollars (2000-2002). The results control for individual fixed effects and clustered standard errors that 
are adjusted for heteroscedasticity across individuals and correlation within. 
  44 
 
Appendix - TABLE 7 
Effects of Bonus Program on Quarterly Change in Total Balance for those that Do Not have Debt and Use 
the Card Prior to the program  
1 Month Before the Program Starts, 3 Months After 
Quarterly Change in Total Balance (N=2113) 
Variable                   Coefficient   Standard Error  T-Stat 
Cashback Dummy  
(Receiving Cashback=1, Not in Program=0)  244.38 183.82 1.33
Change in Behavior Score from Previous Quarter  8.83 11.91  0.74
Change in FICO Score from Previous Quarter  69.28 14.48  4.78
Account Age  423.11 704.02  0.60
Realized APR  -92.11 73.89  -1.25
Credit Line  0.00 0.18  0.00
Total Credit Cards with Debt  1348.70 282.79  4.77
Total Number of Credit Cards  215.99 295.81  0.73
Age 3594.61 1926.52  1.87
Age^2 -36.44 19.83  -1.84
 
Effects of Bonus Program on Quarterly Change in Total Balance for those that Do Not have Debt and DO 
Not Use the Card Prior to the program 
1 Month Before the Program Starts, 3 Months After 
Quarterly Change in Total Balance (N=3095) 
Variable          Coefficient    Standard  Error  T-Stat 
Cashback Dummy  
(Receiving Cashback=1, Not in Program=0)  276.80 159.70 1.73
Change in Behavior Score from Previous Quarter  30.14 12.43  2.42
Change in FICO Score from Previous Quarter  62.18 13.47  4.62
Account Age  984.41 942.20  1.04
Realized APR  98.54 51.72  1.91
Credit Line  0.20 0.20  1.00
Total Credit Cards with Debt  1940.09 779.58  2.49
Total Number of Credit Cards  15.21 329.80  0.05
Age 859.82 1867.58  0.46
Age^2 -3.73 17.79  -0.21
 
Notes: This table reports the coefficient value, the standard error, and the t-statistics for the cashback indicator 
variable in equation (1) for spending for the period 1 month before and 3 months after the program starts. All values 
are in current dollars (2000-2002). The results control for individual fixed effects and clustered standard errors that 
are adjusted for heteroscedasticity across individuals and correlation within. 
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Appendix - TABLE 8A 
Effects of APR Reduction on Spending in Treatment Group 
1 Month Before the Program Starts, 3 Months After 
Spending (N=4633) 
Variable                    Coefficient   Standard Error  T-Stat 
APR Reduction Dummy  
(Receiving APR Reduction=1)  1097.79 84.80 12.95
Change in Behavior Score from Previous Quarter  -15.74 1.88  -8.37
Change in FICO Score from Previous Quarter  2.43 2.33  1.04
Account Age  -387.62 155.90  -2.49
Realized APR  -12.65 6.47  -1.96
Credit Line  0.05 0.08  0.65
Total Balance on All Credit Cards  0.01 0.01  0.47
Total Credit Cards with Debt  -69.78 71.12  -0.98
Total Number of Credit Cards  4.78 66.09  0.07
Age 6.84 622.06  0.01
Age^2 -3.86 6.08  -0.64
 
Effects of APR Reduction on Quarterly Change in Total Balance in Treatment Group 
1 Month Before the Program Starts, 3 Months After 
Quarterly Change in Total Balance (N=4633) 
Variable                    Coefficient   Standard Error  T-Stat 
APR Reduction Dummy  
(Receiving APR Reduction=1)  636.15 432.67 1.47
Change in Behavior Score from Previous Quarter  14.22 8.70  1.63
Change in FICO Score from Previous Quarter  98.92 21.24  4.66
Account Age  97.99 395.68  0.25
Realized APR  -0.12 50.01  0.00
Credit Line  0.36 0.28  1.28
Total Credit Cards with Debt  59.94 628.03  0.10
Total Number of Credit Cards  385.37 481.07  0.80
Age 1243.31 2040.60  0.61
Age^2 -6.33 23.91  -0.26
 
Notes: This table reports the coefficient value, the standard error, and the t-statistics for the APR indicator variable 
in equation (2) for change in credit card balances at the credit bureaus for the period 1 month before and 3 months 
after the program starts. All values are in current dollars (2000-2002). The results control for individual fixed effects 
and clustered standard errors that are adjusted for heteroscedasticity across individuals and correlation within.46 
 
Appendix - TABLE 8B 
Effects of APR Reduction on Change in Debt in Treatment Group 
1 Month Before the Program Starts, 3 Months After 
Change in Debt (N=4022) 
Variable                  Coefficient   Standard Error         T-Stat 
APR Reduction Dummy  
(Receiving APR Reduction=1) 1058.65 117.51  9.01
Change in Behavior Score from Previous Quarter  -26.81 2.72  -9.84
Change in FICO Score from Previous Quarter  2.79 2.84  0.98
Account Age  -336.92 163.22  -2.06
Realized APR  -16.02 8.43  -1.90
Credit Line  0.10 0.11  0.87
Total Balance on All Credit Cards  0.00 0.02  0.06
Total Credit Cards with Debt  -34.43 88.32  -0.39
Total Number of Credit Cards  -35.98 84.86  -0.42
Age -263.55 775.01  -0.34
Age^2 -1.27 7.60  -0.17
 
Notes: This table reports the coefficient value, the standard error, and the t-statistics for the APR indicator variable 
in equation (2) for change in card debt for the period 1 month before and 3 months after the program starts. All 
values are in current dollars (2000-2002). The results control for individual fixed effects and clustered standard 
errors that are adjusted for heteroscedasticity across individuals and correlation within. 
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